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CHAPTER 13 
Civil Practice and Procedure 
JOHN]. CURTIN, JR.* AND WILLIAM G. YOUNG** 
§13.1. Introduction: A Year of Practice under the New Rules. 
This Survey year encompasses the first full year of practice under the 
new Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure1 and marks the advent of 
the District/Municipal Courts Rules of Civil Procedure,2 a system of 
rules similar in design to but different in many details from the Mas-
sachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure. 3 In general, practice under the 
new Rules has tended to confirm the hopes of their advocates that 
simplified rules of procedure might assist in securing "the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."4 
§13.2. Interpretation of Massachusetts Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. The Supreme Judicial Court has done much to assist the bar 
in changing over to the new Rules. Its decisions in this area have been 
both informative and faithful-perhaps to a fault-to the "liberal 
spirit," which exalts substance over form. Not the least of the Court's 
contributions has been an acknowledged adherence to practice in the 
fe<leral courts under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Indeed, 
the settled interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be-
came, in Rollins Environmental Services, Inc. v. Superior Court, 1 the man-
datory guideline for interpreting the cognate Massachusetts Rules. AI-
*joHN]. CuRTIN, JR. is a partner in the law firm of Bingham, Dana & Gould, Boston, 
an instructor in law at Boston College Law School, and is a Fellow in the American Col-
lege of Trial Lawyers. 
**WILLIAM G. YouNG is a partner in the law firm of Bingham, Dana & Gould, Bos-
ton, and is an instructor in law at Boston College Law School. 
§13.1. 1 The Massachusetts ·Rules of Civil Procedure took effect on July 1, 1974. 
They apply to proceedings in the Supreme Judicial Court for the County of Suffolk 
(the single justice session), the Superior Court, the Housing Courts of the City of Bos-
ton and the County of Hampden, to equity proceedings in the various Probate Courts, 
and to various designated proceedings in the Land Court. MASS. R. CIV. P. 1. 
2 The District/Municipal Courts Rules of Civil Procedure took effect on July 1, 1975. 
These Rules govern practice and procedure in the Commonwealth's seventy-two district 
courts as well as in the Municipal Court for the City of Boston. DisT./MuN. CTS. R. Civ. 
P. 1. 
3 For a more detailed comparison of the District/Municipal Courts Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure with the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, see § 13.7 infra. 
4 MASS. R. CIV. P. 1. 
§13.2. 1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2052, 2060, 330 N.E.2d 814, 818. 
1
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though this result had been foreshadowed in Charbonnier v. Amico 2 
and Giacobbe v. First Coolidge Corp., 3 the Supreme Judicial Court ex-
plicitly held in Rollins that, "[t]his court having adopted comprehensive 
rules of civil procedure in substantially the same form as the earlier 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the adjudged construction thereto-
fore given to the Federal rules is to be given to our rules, absent 
compelling reasons to the contrary or significant differences in 
content."4 
This direction to interpret the Massachusetts Rules in conformity 
with the Federal Rules could hardly be more specific. To justify a de-
viant interpretation, one must be able to point to some "compelling" 
policy reason or "significant differences" in the language of the 
specific Massachusetts and Federal Rules under consideration.5 
Otherwise, the interpretation given the Federal Rules is to govern 
Massachusetts practice. Still, in order for the federal construction to 
govern, it must have been "adjudged" by some federal court. 6 Appar-
ently, the views of commentators on the construction of the various 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, although perhaps persuasive, are 
not deemed to be controlling for purposes of Massachusetts practice, 
unless those views are backed up by federal court decisions in point. 
It will not be sufficient, therefore, to merely cite the interpretation 
given by an expert on federal procedure or by the reporters to the 
Federal Rules in a brief on a Massachusetts procedural issue. Conse-
quently, it would seem that if the Massachusetts courts are to be ex-
pected to follow the construction given to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, they ought to be directed to the specific federal court de-
cisions upon which reliance is to be placed. 
A more knotty problem may perhaps arise from the Court's direc-
tion in Rollins that the judicial construction to be followed in Mas-
sachusetts is that "theretofore" given to the Federal Rules. 7 The use of 
the word "theretofore," if deliberate, implies that the governing con-
2 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 653, 662, 324 N.E.2d 895, 899. In Charbonnier, the Court noted 
that the new Massachusetts Rules were based on the Federal Rules. /d. at 662, 324 
N.E.2d at 899. 
3 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 894, 903-06, 325 N.E.2d 922, 926-27. By way of dictum, the 
Court in Giacobbe approved of an interpretation of a new Massachusetts Rule that was 
based on the accepted interpretation of the parallel Federal Rule. /d. at 905, 325 
N.E.2d at 927. 
4 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2060, 330 N.E.2d at 818. Rollins did not address the ap-
plicability of the interpretation of the Federal Rules to the Massachusetts District/ 
Municipal Courts Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect one year after the Mass-
achusetts Rules of Civil Procedure. The broad language of the decision, however, compels 
the conclusion that the federal interpretation is expected to guide resolution of procedural 
problems in the district and municipal courts as well as in the superior court . 
• /d. 
6 /d. 
7 /d. 
2
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struction is to be that given to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
before July 1, 1974. Thus, the Federal Rules would be imported into 
Massachusetts practice in much the same way that the English Com-
mon Law was adopted as the American rule of decision following the 
American Revolution. The later decisions of the English courts, al-
though persuasive, were not considered to be direct guides to Ameri-
can practice. 8 If this is what the Court meant by its use of the word 
"theretofore," decisions of the federal courts interpreting the Federal 
Rules after July 1, 1974 can merely be argued to be persuasive, not 
dispositive, of the identical point raised under the Massachusetts 
Rules. It will be unfortunate if Rollins is read in such a fashion. One 
of the great benefits to the practitioner of the adoption of Mas-
sachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure similar to the Federal Rules is the 
uniformity of the two systems. To consider federal procedural deci-
sions subsequent to July 1, 1974 as merely persuasive, simply because 
the particular procedural point at issue had not been raised in federal 
practice prior to that date, would not promote such uniformity. It is 
to be hoped, therefore, that as interpretation of the Federal Rules 
evolves in the federal courts, such evolution will be followed in Mas-
sachusetts absent compelling reasons to the contrary or significant dif-
ferences in content in the Massachusetts Rules. 
§13.3. The Doctrines of Primary Jurisdiction and Exhaustion of 
Administrative Remedies.1 The proliferation during the past few 
decades of agencies charged with regulatory and adjudicatory func-
tions has led to the adoption in the Commonwealth of two doctrines 
that are intended to guide the judiciary in deciding when to grant re-
view of controversies that have been or can be subject to administra-
tive review as well. Aspects of these doctrines-the doctrine of ex-
haustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary 
jurisdiction-were clarified by the Supreme Judicial Court in two of 
its decisions rendered during the Survey year. In Ciszewski v. Industrial 
Accident Board, 2 the Court further defined the scope of an exception 
to the exhaustion doctrine by holding that a dispute over whether an 
agency has the authority and power under its enabling statute to 
promulgate regulations need not be resolved by final agency action 
prior to judicial review because it falls within the class of disputes for 
which administrative remedies would be inadequate or resort to them 
futile.3 Then, in]. & ]. Enterprises, Inc. v. Martignetti, 4 the Court stated 
8 See generally H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 450-51 (tent. ed. 1958); R. 
PoUND, THE FoRMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAw 96-97 (1938); Hall, The Common Law: An 
Account of Its Reception in the United States, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 791 (1951). 
§13.3. 1 The authors gratefully acknowledge the research of Paul J. Lambert, Esq., 
into the federal precedents bearing on the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. 
2 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 635, 325 N.E.2d 270. 
3 I d. at 644, 325 N .E.2d at 274. 
4 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 172, 341 N.E.2d 645. 
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under what circumstances, when both a court and an agency have 
original jurisdiction, the court should dismiss its proceedings on the 
grounds of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.5 
I. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. 
In the Commonwealth, the general rule is that "[i]n the absence of 
a statutory directive to the contrary, the administrative remedies 
should be exhausted before resort [is had] to the courts."6 This gen-
eral rule has been consistently reaffirmed in East Chop Tennis Club v. 
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, 7 Ciszewski v. Industrial 
Accident Board, 8 and]. & ]. Enterprises, Inc. v. Martignetti. 9 
Although the general rule remains intact, the most recent 
developments- perhaps indicating increasing dissatisfaction with 
cumbersome and dilatory administrative proceedings-have been de-
voted to examining the extent of the exceptions to this rule. The 
longest-standing exception to the exhaustion rule involves petitions 
for declaratory judgment that raise what the Supreme Judicial Court 
calls "tax challenges."10 This exception was first articulated in Meenes 
v. Goldberg11 and has since been further defined, so that it is now ap-
parent that an action for declaratory relief challenging some aspect of 
the state or municipal taxing system, which challenge will have a 
generalized effect upon that system, may be maintained without prior 
resort to the agency involved. 12 
The second recognized exception to the exhaustion doctrine is that, 
"[ w ]here the agency is acting under an unconstitutional statute, or is 
acting beyond its jurisdiction, a judge may ... exercise jurisdiction de-
5 /d. at 177-81, 341 N.E.2d at 648-49. 
6 Gordon v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 361 Mass. 582, 587, 281 N.E.2d 573, 577 
( 1972). In the Gordon case, the Supreme Judicial Court held that a complaint asserting 
allegations of unfair acts on the part of the defendant insurance company was properly 
directed to the Commissioner of Insurance. /d. at 588, 281 N.E.2d at 577. 
7 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1611, 1615, 305 N.E.2d 507, 510. This decision is the subject 
of an extensive note in O'Dea, Civil Practice and Procedure, 1974 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW 
§ 12.4, at 271-74. 
8 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 635, 643, 325 N.E.2d 270, 273-74. 
9 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 172, 177-78, 341 N.E.2d 645,648. 
10 East Chop Tennis Club v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 1973 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 1611, 1616,305 N.E.2d 507,511. 
11 331 Mass. 688, 690-92, 122 N.E.2d 356, 358-59 (1954). 
12 See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 1973 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 863, 866, 296 N.E.2d 805, 808; Massachusetts Ass'n of Tobacco Distribs. 
v. State Tax Comm'n, 354 Mass. 85, 87-88, 235 N.E.2d 557, 559 (1968); Stow v. Com-
missioner of Corps. & Taxation, 336 Mass. 337, 339-40, 145 N.E.2d 720, 721"-22 (1957); 
Squantum Gardens, Inc. v. Assessors of Quincy, 335 Mass. 440, 443 140 N.E.2d 482, 
484-85 (1957); Madden v. State Tax Comm'n, 333 Mass. 734, 736-37, 133 N.E.2d 252, 
254 (1956). But see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Somerville, 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 943, 
944-46, 298 N.E.2d 693, 694-95. 
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spite failure to exhaust administrative remedies."13 
Finally, it has been generally recognized that courts can exercise 
jurisdiction, even in areas of special agency competence, if the ad-
ministrative remedy available under agency procedure, regulations, or 
its legislative enabling act would be inadequate, or the circumstances 
demonstrate that resort to the administrative remedy would be 
futile. 14 Indeed, the litigant's right to have recourse to the courts 
where administrative remedies would be futile was codified in 1974 
and is now set forth in chapter 231A of the General Laws.15 
This third exception was reconfirmed and applied in Ciszewski v. In-
dustrial Accident Board, 16 where the plaintiff brought an action for a 
declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that, under the Industrial 
Accident Board's enabling act, the Board was empowered to promul-
gate a rule of prehearing discovery permitting inspection of the work 
area where an injury allegedly occurred.17 In response, the Industrial 
Accident Board argued that, among other things, the plaintiff had 
failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. 18 The plaintiffs action 
was dismissed in superior court, but on appeal, the Supreme Judicial 
Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with 
its opinion. 19 Chief Justice Tauro, speaking for a unanimous Court, 
held that, where, as in this case, no further fact-finding was required 
and the controversy centered around the authority and power of an 
agency under its enabling statute to promulgate regulations, the "in-
adequate or futile remedies" exception to the exhaustion doctrine 
should be applied.20 The Court carefully limited its holding, however, 
by stating: "We emphasize ... that this exception applies only where 
13 Ciszewski, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 644 n.6, 325 N.E.2d at 274 n.6. Accord, Harrison 
v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 723, 725, 296 N.E.2d 196, 198; 
Hathaway Bakeries, Inc. v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 316 Mass. 136, 139-43, 55 N.E.2d 
254, 255-57 (1944). One of the most definitive statements of the general rule and of 
this exception is found in St. Luke's Hosp. v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 320 Mass. 467, 
470-71, 70 N.E.2d 10, 12 (1946). For the seminal decisions upon whichjudicial restraint 
of administrative proceedings is grounded, see Connecticut River R.R. v. County 
Comm'rs, 127 Mass. 50, 58-60 (1879) (Gray, C.J.); Vermont & Mass. R.R. v. County 
Comm'rs 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 1·2, 16 (1852). 
14 Boston Edison Co. v. Selectmen of Concord, 355 Mass. 79, 84-85, 242 N .E.2d 868, 
872 (1968); Jordan Marsh Co. v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 312 Mass. 597, 601-02, 45 
N.E.2d 925, 927-28 (1942) (dictum). 
15 G.L. c. 231A as amended by Acts of 1974, c. 630, § l. This statute, originally drafted 
and proposed under the auspices of the Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, is more 
thoroughly discussed in O'Dea, Civil Practice and Procedure, 1974 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW 
§ 12.4, at 275-76. 
18 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 635, 325 N.E.2d 270. 
17 Id. at 636-37, 325 N.E.2d at 271-72. G.L. c. 152, § 5, states that the Board "may 
make rules consistent with this chapter for carrying out its provisions." 
18 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 637, 325 N.E.2d at 272. 
19 /d. at 637-38, 647, 325 N.E.2d at 272, 275. 
20 /d. at 644-45, 325 N.E.2d at 274. 
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the power and authority of the agency themselves are in question, and 
not where the exercise of that agency's discretion is challenged."21 In 
the latter instance, of course, recourse must first be made to the pro-
cedures that the agency has for correcting the challenged action or 
order. Only after that avenue has been exhausted, can judicial review 
be had. 
II. PRIMARY jURISDICTION 
The United States Supreme Court took the first step towards the 
harmonization of the roles of court and agency in Texas & Pacific 
Railway Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co. 22 In Abilene Cotton, the Court held 
that a shipper seeking reparations predicated upon the unreasonable-
ness of an established rate must first seek relief before the Interstate 
Commerce Commission. 23 The Supreme Court reached this conclu-
sion despite its recognition that the relevant statute provided federal 
district courts with jurisdiction concurrent with that of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission over suits concerning the validity of rates.24 
The Court stated that its holding was dictated by the purpose of the 
Interstate Commerce Act, which was to eliminate discrimination in 
rates by placing on all carriers the duty to establish schedules of 
reasonable rates that, upon approval by the Commission, would have 
uniform application. 25 The Court found that the statute granted the 
Commission, which initially approved the rate, the power to hear 
complaints concerning violations of the Act, to direct the payment of 
reparations, and to order the carrier to cease and desist from further 
violations. 26 If this power were exercised by the courts, the result 
would be the "absolute destruction of the [A]ct."27 
For if, without previous action by the Commission, power might 
be exerted by courts and juries generally to determine the reason-
ableness of an established rate, it would follow that unless all 
courts reached an identical conclusion a uniform standard of rates 
in the future would be impossible, as the standard would fluctuate 
and vary, dependent upon the divergent conclusions reached as to 
reasonableness by the various courts called upon to consider the 
subject as an original question. Indeed the recognition of such a 
21 Id. at 644, 325 N.E.2d at 274. 
22 204 U.S. 426 (1907). Mr. Justice Frankfurter later referred to this harmonization as 
"one of those creative judicial labors whereby modern administrative law is being de-
veloped as part of our traditional system of law." Far East Conference v. United States, 
342 u.s. 570, 575 (1952). 
2a 204 U.S. at 448. 
24 !d. at 436, 438-39. 
2
" !d. at 439-41. 
26 !d. at 441. 
27 Id. at 440. 
6
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right is wholly inconsistent with the administrative power 
conferred upon the Commission and with the duty, which the stat-
ute casts upon that body, of seeing to it that the statutory re-
quirement as to uniformity and equality of rates is observed. 28 
In Abilene Cotton, the Court stressed the goal of uniformity, which 
would be fostered if, in the first instance, a specialized agency decided 
issues subject to its regulations. Subsequent federal cases emphasized 
as well an additional policy consideration favoring initial deferral by 
courts to agencies having jurisdiction over matters complained of. In 
Great Northern Railway Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 29 the Supreme 
Court, spea!ring through Justice Brandeis, held again that, where the 
complaint filed in court raised issues within the jurisdiction of an ad-
ministrative agency, the plaintiff must first seek relief before the 
agency involved.30 Two reasons were given. First, resort to the agency 
advanced the interest of uniformity.31 Second, a sound resolution of 
the issue required "acquaintance with many intricate facts of transpor-
tation" and "such acquaintance is commonly to be found only in a 
body of experts."32 Similarly, the Court said in Federal Maritime Board 
v. Isbrandtsen Co. :33 
It is recognized that the courts, while retaining the final authority 
to expound the statute, should avail themselves of the aid implicit 
in the agency's superiority in gathering the relevant facts and in 
marshaling them into a meaningful pattern. Cases are not de-
cided, nor the law appropriately understood, apart from an in-
formed and particularized insight into the factual circumstances 
of the controversy under litigation. 34 
The rationales of uniformity and expertise were combined by Mr. 
Justice Frankfurter in an oft-quoted passage in Far East Conference v. 
United States: 35 
[I]n cases raising issues of fact not within the conventional ex-
periences of judges or cases requiring the exercise of administra-
tive discretion, agencies created by Congress for regulating the 
subject matter should not be passed over. This is so even though 
the facts after they have been appraised by specialized compe-
tence serve as a premise for legal consequences to be judicially de-
fined. Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business 
28 I d. at 440-41. 
29 259 u.s. 285 (1922). 
30 !d. at 291. 
31 !d. 
32 Id. 
33 356 u.s. 481 ( 1958). 
34 !d. at 498. 
35 342 u.s. 570 (1952). 
7
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entrusted to a particular agency are secured, and the limited func-
tions of review by the judiciary are more rationally exercised, by 
preliminary resort for ascertaining and interpreting the circum-
stances underlying legal issues to agencies that are better equipped 
than courts by specialization, by insight gained through ex-
perience, and by more flexible procedure.36 
During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court addressed itself 
to the issue of when a court ought to apply the doctrine of primary 
jurisdiction. In]. & ]. Enterprises, Inc. v. Martignetti, 37 Justice Braucher, 
speaking for the Court, considered various remedies that litigants 
may seek in situations where a court and an administrative agency 
have concurrent jurisdiction, and prescribed the appropriate judicial 
response for each situation.38 In essence, Justice Braucher stated that: 
1. Where a plaintiff seeks injunctive or declaratory relief and the 
entire controversy is within the exclusive jurisdiction of an administra-
tive agency, the judicial proceedings ought generally to be dismissed.39 
2. Where the plaintiff seeks prospective relief and the agency has 
jurisdiction of only part of the matter in controversy, the judicial pro-
ceedings ought also to be dismissed since the action can be reinsti-
tuted after administrative remedies have been exhausted. 40 
3. Where, however, the plaintiff seeks damages for past conduct 
and those damages cannot be awarded by the agency, judicial pro-
ceedings ought to be stayed until the administrative agency has acted 
upon those matters within its jurisdictionY 
As Ciszewski and]. & ]. Enterprises make clear, the Supreme Judicial 
Court, while continuing to assert the primacy of the exhaustion and 
primary jurisdiction doctrines, is proceeding with extreme care to in-
sure that the genuine rights of litigants are not impaired. 
36 /d. at 574-75. 
37 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 172,341 N.E.2d 645. 
38 /d. at 177-81, 341 N.E.2d at 648-49. 
39 /d. at 177-78, 341 N .E.2d at 648. Just as actions seeking injunctive or declaratory 
relief as to matters that fall within the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction of adminis-
trative agencies ought be dismissed, so too amendments to complaints seeking to raise 
such claims are routinely denied despite the general liberality of Massachusetts Rule of 
Civil Procedure 15, since "it would be an idle move for the court to allow such amend-
ment over the objection of the opposing party who, if correct, has merely to make a 
formal motion to dismiss ... after leave to amend is granted." 3 J. MooRE, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE H5.08[4], at 904-05 (2d ed. 1974). Accord, Knitting Machs. Corp. v. Hayward 
Hosiery Co., 95 F. Supp. 510, 512 (D. Mass. 1950); Potter v. Travelers Indem. Co., 
No. 8244 (Suffolk Super. Ct., Feb. 2, 1976) (McNaught, j.) (leave to amend denied 
upon the ground, inter alia, that the amendment sought a ueclaration of the reasonable 
level of insurance commissions required to be paid under G.L. c. 175, § 1131, which 
had in the first instance, to be decided by the Insurance Commissioner pursuant to 
G.L. c. 175, § 113H). 
40 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 179,341 N.E.2d at 648. 
41 /d. at 179-80, 341 N .E.2d at 648-49. 
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§13.4. Class Actions: Mootness. When an individual purports to 
bring a suit on behalf of a class, the litigation may acquire a life of its 
own. General principles permitting parties to dismiss or compromise 
their own disputes are not applicable under the Massachusetts and 
Federal Rules governing class actions, which preclude dismissal or 
compromise without court approval,l During the Survey year, the 
Supreme Judi(;ial Court held in Wolf v. Commissioner of Public Welfare, 2 
a case of first impression, that a class action is not mooted by the ter-
mination of the individual claim of the named plaintiff who purports 
to represent the class. 3 
In Wolf, the plaintiff, who was receiving public assistance in the 
form of aid to families with dependent children (AFDC), sued on be-
half of herself and all others receiving AFDC "[who have] failed or 
will have failed during the pendency of this action to receive an assis-
tance check issued by the ... [Department of Public Welfare (DPW)] 
and who have or will have been denied a prompt replacement of the 
check by the Department."4 The plaintiff alleged that after not having 
received her bimonthly assistance check on time, she properly gave 
notice of that fact to the DPW but was still unsuccessful in obtaining a 
replacement check from the DPW, which "generally delays" in replac-
ing such checks.5 Therefore, the plaintiff filed this suit, seeking (1) an 
order that the Department replace all reportedly unreceived AFDC 
checks within four days of the mailing of the original, (2) a declara-
tion that the federal Social Security Act and regulations require im-
mediate replacement of assistance checks, and (3) that state regula-
tions require replacement of reportedly unreceived AFDC checks 
within four days of the ~ailing of the original. 6 
The superior court dismissed the bill on the ground of mootness, 
since the parties agreed that the DPW did issue the plaintiffs re-
placement check shortly after the commencement of the suit. 7 The 
Appeals Court affirmed, although on different grounds, but the Su-
preme Judicial Court reversed, holding that a class action should not be 
dismissed for mootness prior to the court's determination whether it 
should certify the class, regardless of whether the representative 
plaintiff has already recttived the relief sought. 8 
The case is noteworthy in several aspects, the first of which is the 
Court's adherence to federal court precedents. The Court began its 
analysis of the mootness issue by noting that the issue has been the 
§13.4. 1 Mass. R. Civ. P. 23(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). 
2 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 871, 327 N.E.2d 885. 
3 Id. at 880-81, 327 N.E.2d at 890. 
• I d. at 872, 327 N.E.2d at 887. 
5 I d. 
6 Id. at 872-73, 327 N.E.2d at 887. 
7 Id. at 873 & n.1, 879 n.8, 327 N.E.2d at 887 & n.1, 889 n.8. 
8 Id. at 880-81, 327 N.E.2d at 889-90. 
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subject of considerable attention in federal courts and by citing to sev-
eral federal court cases holding that a r.amed plaintiffs receipt of de-
sired relief does not moot a class action. 9 Although the English Bill of 
Peace is a common ancestor to both Massachusetts and federal class 
actions, 10 the advent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
categorized classes somewhat ambiguously in 1938 and then more 
functionally by amendment in 1966,11 gave an impetus to class actions 
in federal courts that was absent from Massachusetts litigation.12 Class 
action precedents are thus more likely to be federal. 
Furthermore, the Court's initial examination in Wolf of the relevant 
federal case law reflects to some extent its continuing reliance on fed-
eral interpretations, a practice that culminated recently in its holding 
in Rollins Environmental Services, Inc. v. Superior Court 13 that the ad-
judged construction previously given to the Federal Rules is to be 
given to the Massachusetts Rules in the absence of compelling reasons 
to the contrary or significant differences in context. 14 This holding 
was not controlling in Wolf, since suit was commenced prior to the ef-
fective date of the new Rules and since federal views of mootness are 
based on the constitutional limitation of the jurisdiction of federal 
courts to actual cases or controversies. 15 
Since federal precedents should be more restrictive-because of the 
additional case or controversy requirement-the cited cases upholding 
jurisdiction on facts similar to those in Wolf would be influential. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Judicial Court's analysis of the rationale of 
the mootness doctrine provides a sounder underpinning to its deci-
sion than mere reliance on federal precedent. Judge Wilkins, writing 
for a unanimous Court, analyzed reasons underlying refusals to hear 
moot cases as follows: 
(a) only factually concrete disputes are capable of resolution 
through the adversary process, (b) it is feared that the parties will 
not adequately represent positions in which they no longer have a 
personal stake, (c) the adjudication of hypothetical disputes would 
9 ld. at 876 &: n.6, 327 N.E.2d at 888 &: n.6, citing Like v. Carter, 448 F.2d 798, 802 
(8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1045 (1972); Copeland v. Parham, 330 F. Supp. 
383,385 (N.D. Ga. 1971), affd sub nom. Copeland v. Saucier, 475 F.2d 1127, 1129 (5th 
Cir. 1973); Adens v. Sailer, 312 F. Supp. 923, 926 (E.D. Pa. 1970). 
1° Chafee, Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1297, 1307-10 (1932). 
11 Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 2!1, 39 F.R.D. 98-107 
(1966). 
11 See Spear v. H.V. Greene Co., 246 Mass. 259, 266-67, 140 N.E. 795, 797-98 (1923) 
for an analysis of the prerequisites to maintenance of a class bill under case law antedat-
ing the new Massachusetts Rules. 
18 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2052, 330 N.E.2d 814, discussed in§ 13.2 supra. 
14 ld. at 2060,330 N.E.2d at 818. 
15 U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2, cl. 1; Liner v. Jafco Inc., 375 U.S. 301 (1964). 
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encroach on the legislative domain, and (d) judicial economy re-
quires that insubstantial controversies not be htigated. 16 
He then reasoned that these judicial concerns would be met in this 
case, if there was an actual controversy between the class and the de-
fendant, if the case was appropriate for class treatment, and if the 
plaintiff was an adequate representative of the class. 17 Since suit was 
begun before the effective date of the new Rules, the Court relied 
upon the leading Massachusetts pre-Rules .:ase on class actions as au-
thority for this line of reasoningY~" However, the Court also specifi-
cally referred to Massachusetts Rule of Civil Procedure 23 as author-
ity, thereby implying that its holding would have been the same had 
the new Rules been in effect. 19 
Several "independent considerations" militating against mootness 
also influenced the Court's decision. One independent consideration 
that influenced the Court"s decision in Wolf was the Court's unwilling-
ness on the basis of traditional equity principles to permit a 
defendant's termination of allegedly wrongful conduct to preclude in-
junctive relief, since the purpose of an injunction is to prevent future, 
as well as current, violations. 20 The Court found support for this 
theory in United States v. W.T. Grant Co. 21 in which the United States 
Supreme Court held that the mere voluntary cessation of allegedly il-
legal conduct by the defendant does not make a case moot or deprive 
a court of its power to grant injunctive relief unless the defendant can 
meet the "heavy burden" of showing that there is no reasonable ex-
pectation that the wrong will be repeated. 22 
Another independent consideration that influenced the Court's de-
cision in Wolf was the fact that the alleged injury in Wolf-delay in re-
ceipt of replacement checks-was "capable of repetition, yet evading 
review."23 The "capable of repeti~ion, yet evading review" doctrine was 
first applied by the Supreme Court in Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. 
ICC, 24 in which the ICC's motion to dismiss on mootness grounds was 
denied because, although the ICC order which the plaintiff sought to 
have enjoined had expired, the ICC could be expected to repeat the 
conduct that was allegedly contrary to the rights asserted by the par-
ticular named plaintiffs. 25 
16 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 877, 327 N.E.2d at 889. 
17 !d. at 878, 327 N.E.2d at 889. 
18 /d. The leading case was Spear v. H.V. Greene Co., 246 Mass. 259, 266-67, 140 
N.E. 795, 797-98 (1923). 
19 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 878, 327 N.E.2d at 889-90. 
20 /d. at 879, 327 N.E.2d at 890. 
21 345 u.s. 629 (1953). 
22 /d. at 632-33. 
23 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 878, 327 N.E.2d at 889-90. 
24 219 u.s. 498 (19ll). 
25 Id. at 514-16; accord, Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969). 
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The United States Supreme Court recently extended the application 
of the doctrine of "capable of repetition, yet evading review" to class 
actions in which the defendants could not be expected to repeat con-
duct that allegedly was contrary to rights of the named plaintiffs but 
could be expected to act contrary to the rights of other class members. 
In Sosna v. Iowa, 26 a class action was held to be not moot even though 
the particular named plaintiff, who purported to represent a class 
barred from Iowa's courts by a durational residency requirement of 
Iowa, was herself no longer subject to the residency requirement since 
the required time for her own eligibility had passed. 27 The Court 
stated in Sosna that, although the controversy was no longer live as to 
Sosna, it remained "very much alive" for the class she had been cer-
tified to represent, and that since the issue sought to be litigated 
would always escape full appellate review at the behest of any single 
challenger, it should not inexorably become moot by the intervening 
resolution of the controversy as to the named plaintiff.28 In Wolf, the 
Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the situation before it involved 
the same considerations as those that were present in Sosna, since the 
passage of time during an appeal process would likely moot the claim 
of any named plaintiff seeking a replacement check. 29 
In Sosna, the Supreme Court only extended the "capable of repeti-
tion, yet evading review" principle to class actions in which the named 
plaintiffs claim, even though subsequently mooted, was "live" at the 
time the class was certified.30 As to the issue whether the "capable of 
repetition" doctrine would have applied if the named plaintiffs claim 
had become moot before the class was certified, the Sosna Court merely 
noted that whether certification could relate back to the filing of the 
complaint might depend upon the circumstances of the particular case 
and upon whether the issue would otherwise evade review. 31 
In Wolf, the trial court dismissed the case for mootness before 
reaching the issue of certification.32 The Supreme Judicial Court in 
Wolf cited the presumptive validity rule under which courts have held 
that an action commenced as a class action retains that character until 
the court rules otherwise. 33 The Court did not expressly comment on 
the discussions in Sosna concerning certifying a class where the named 
plaintiff is not even a member because his claim has already become 
moot. The Court merely remanded the case to the superior court with 
26 419 u.s. 393 (1975). 
27 /d. at 401-02. 
28 /d. 
29 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 878, 327 N.E.2d at 889-90. 
3° 419 U.S. at 402. 
31 /d. at 402 n.1l. 
32 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 877, 327 N.E.2d at 889. 
33 /d.; Gaddis v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 713, 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), affd sub nom. 
Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U.S. 49 (1970). 
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a carefully worded reference to Sosna as indicating that "the [trial] 
Judge should have passed on the existence of a proper class before 
considering the question of mootness."34 Presumably, the superior 
court will address the problem in the context of the analysis of Sosna, 
which shifts "the focus of examination [of whether a named plaintiff 
is entitled to litigate the interest of the class] from the elements of jus-
ticiability to the ability of the named representative to 'fairly and ade-
quately protect the interests of the class.' "35 Within that context, the 
court will undoubtedly keep in mind that the litigation contemplates 
that all members of the class will be bound by the judgment.38 In de-
termining whether the named plaintiff can fairly and adequately rep-
resent the class interests, the focus thus becomes whether there are 
possible conflicts of interest within the class and whether the class in-
terests will be advocated competently.37 In effect, the Supreme Judi-
cial Court has accepted the view of some commentators that determi-
nation of class status is mandatory and must be decided prior to rul-
ing on mootness. 38 
§ 13.5. Discovery: Equitable Bill. There is a tendency to assume 
that since one of the great benefits of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil 
Procedure is to promote uniformity, 1 all of the litigation tools of a 
practitioner are to be found in the Rules. The Supreme Judicial Court 
has recently reminded us, though, that a litigator may use tools apart 
from the Rules to help his case. In Wolfe v. Massachusetts Port 
Authority, 2 the Court reaffirmed the current availability of a bill of dis-
covery. Despite a previous general hostility to the availability of such 
relief against a nonparty, the Court held that a bill of discovery is 
permitted against a public instrumentality not a prospective party to 
the suit if in the bill plaintiff alleges (1) an ongoing or contemplated 
cause of action for which information is needed and (2) sufficient 
facts to demonstrate the inadequacy of statutory interrogatories and 
the essentiality of the bill to the preparation of plaintiffs position in 
that cause of action.3 Although the new Rules were not applicable to 
the case, this holding is consistent with these Rules because, as the 
Court specifically noted, the new Rules do not eliminate an 
" 'independent action against a person not a party for production of 
documents and things and permission to enter upon land.' "4 
84 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 877, 327 N.E.2d at 889. 
35 419 U.S. at 403, quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
38 MASS. R. CIV. P. 23(d), 
31 MASS. R. CIV. P. 23(a) 8c (b). 
38 38 j. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE,23.50, at 23.1101 (2d ed. 1975). See generally 
Bledsoe, Mootness and Standing in Class Actions, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 430 (1973). 
§13.5. 1 See § 13.2 supra. 
1 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2187,319 N.E.2d 423. 
3 /d. at 2192-93, 319 N .E.2d at 426. 
4 /d. at 2188 n.1, 319 N.E.2d at 424 n.1, quoting MASS. R. CIV. P. 34(c). 
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Discovery by bill in equity, particularly against nonparties, has been 
historically quite restricted. 5 In Post & Co. v. Toledo, Cincinnati & St. 
Louis Railroad Co., 6 decided in 1887, the Court did permit a bill of dis-
covery to be maintained against corporate officers who were not likely 
to be parties in the suit which the plaintiff was planning to bring 
against the corporation's shareholders. 7 The Court permitted the bill 
Ito be maintained on the ground that the plaintiff had a valid cause of 
1 action against the shareholders and was unable to obtain informa-
tion identifying them by ordinary discovery methods. 8 In the next two 
cases in which the Court was asked to permit a bill of discovery, how-
ever, the Court adhered to the "general rule" that a person who is a 
stranger to or who might merely be called as a witness in the 
plaintiffs pending or prospective suit cannot be ordered to comply 
with the plaintiffs discovery requests. 9 The Court reasoned that re-
laxation of this rule would lead to abuses that the rule's establishment 
was intended to prevent, such as enabling the plaintiff to fish for in-
formation to determine if he might have any causes of action against 
persons other than the defendant named in the bill in equity for 
discovery. 10 
Seventy years after Post, however, in MacPherson v. Boston Edison 
Co., 11 the Court did once again permit a bill of discovery to be main-
tained against strangers to pending litigation. 12 In MacPherson, 
though, the Court did not abandon the "general rule." Rather, a ma-
jority of the Court held that a trial court in its discretion can permit a 
bill of discovery to be maintained if it meets two conditions. 13 The bill 
must contain allegations that the usual discovery procedures are in-
adequate to obtain necessary information and that the bill meets the 
requirements that bills of discovery had to meet under ancient chan-
cery practice. 14 The Court reaffirmed that such a bill was appropriate 
against nonparties who are corporate officers of a party defendant. 15 
The Court also held that a bill for discovery against a stranger to 
litigation may be maintained if it merely seeks an order that the plain-
tiff be allowed to enter upon the stranger's premises to obtain discov-
ery of property in which a party to the pending or prospective litiga-
5 /d. at 2189, 319 N.E.2d at 425. 
6 144 Mass. 341, 11 N.E. 540 (1887). 
7 !d. at 350, 11 N.E. at 548-49. 
8 /d. 
"American Security & Trust Co. v. Brooks, 225 Mass. 500, 502, 504, 114 N.E. 732, 
732-33 (1917); Kelly v. Morrison, 176 Mass. 531,536, 57 N.E. 1019, 1020 (1900). 
'"American Security & Trust Co. v. Brooks, 225 Mass. 500, 503-04, 114 N.E. 732, 
733 (1917). 
11 336 Mass. 94, 142 N.E.2d 758 (1957). 
12 /d. at 105-06, 142 N.E.2d at 766-67. 
13Jd. 
14Jd. 
15 /d. at 105, 142 N.E.2d at 766-67. 
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tion has an interest. 16 The Court distinguished this situation from the 
cases in which bills seeking discovery of the property in which the 
stranger had an interest were dismissed on the grounds of the "general 
rule."17 
The only authority that the present Court could cite in Wolfe to 
support exceptions to the hostility of Massachusetts courts to bills for 
discovery against non parties was the Post case decided in 1887. 18 In 
Post, however, as previously noted, the individuals required to disclose 
facts concerning the litigation were corporate officers of a corporation 
whose shareholders were parties to the litigation. An exception to the 
general rule-prohibiting discovery from nonparties-had long ap-
plied to corporate officers in suits against corporations and a broader 
exception had been suggested to apply to agency relationships such as 
those that exist between corporate officers and shareholders. 19 In 
Wolfe, an agency relationship does not exist between the public 
instrumentality-the nonparty against whom discovery is being 
sought-and the prospective party defendant about whom the plain-
tiff is seeking information in his bill for discovery. Therefore, even a 
broad exception to the general rule for agency relationships is not 
applicable to the situation in Wolfe. 
Despite the limited amount of precedent supporting its position, 
the Court had no difficulty in concluding that when the nonparty, 
from whom the discovery is being sought, is a public instrumentality, the 
nonparty should be compelled to furnish information to a prospective 
litigant that might help identify possible defendants. 20 The Court 
reasoned that, in prior decisions, bills of discovery against strangers to 
litigation were prohibited in order to protect the privacy of those 
persons. 21 Since a public instrumentality serves public ends and the public 
welfare, however, a rationale designed to protect the privacy of private 
individuals is inapplicable.22 Therefore, the Court held that a plaintiff 
could obtain discovery from a public instrumentality if he "( 1) has prop-
erly described an ongoing or contemplated cause of action for which 
information is needed and (2) has alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate 
the inadequacy of statutory interrogatories and the essentiality of the bill 
of discovery as an aid to the plaintiff's position in the court proceeding in 
the cause of action."23 The Court noted that the instrumentality may 
object to the discovery of confidential or excessively numerous docu-
16 Jd. at 104-05, 142 N.E.2d at 766. 
17 Id. 
18 Wolfe, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2189, 319 N.E.2d at 425. 
19 American Security & Trust Co. v. Brooks, 225 Mass. 500, 502, ll4 N.E. 732 (1917). 
20 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2192-93, 319 N.E.2d at 426. 
21 Jd. at 2190-91, 319 N.E.2d at 425. 
22 I d. 
23 Id. at 2192-93, 319 N.E.2d at 426. 
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ments at a hearing on the merits of the bill.24 Resolution of that dispute 
would be in the discretion of the trial judge, who was specifically ad-
monished to ensure that the bill addresses a "limited purpose" for which it 
provides a "practical and reasonable" discovery procedure.25 
The opinion in Wolfe is consistent with a general objective of balancing 
the interest of justice to the parties to litigation against the freedom of 
non parties to be left alone. Modern deposition practice has imposed more 
serious burdens on both individuals and corporations who are not parties 
to litigation. The narrow practical relief afforded here would appear not 
to significantly add to the burdens of nonparties and may prevent an 
injustice. The rule adopted by the Court, however, may not be limited in 
the future to public instrumentalities. The Court went out of its way to 
note that it did not intend to foreclose future consideration of similar 
equitable actions against nonpublic entities. 26 An astute litigator may 
accept this invitation. 
§13.6. Summary Affirmance of Appeals. During the Survey year, 
the Appeals Court adopted Massachusetts Appeals Court Rule 1:28 
(hereinafter Rule 1: 28), which authorizes summary affirmance of ap-
peals and which became effective on September 8, 1975. 1 Rule 1:28 
permits a panel of justices of the Appeals Court to determine on its 
own motion and without entertaining oral argument in a civil case 
that no substantial question of law is presented by the appeal. Upon 
making this determination, the Appeals Court may, by written order, 
summarily affirm the judgment of the trial court. 2 
Soon after the Appeals Court began to use Rule 1:28, the Rule was 
challenged in Sabatinelli v. Travelers Insurance Co. 3 The Supreme 
Judicial Court held in Sabatinelli ( 1) that there was no constitutional or 
statutory bar to adoption of tqe Rule, and (2) that, although it "may 
not be the best way to achieve a desirable allocation of appellate judi-
cial effort," its application to the appeal in the instant case was 
24 !d. at 2193, 319 N .E.2d at 426. 
25 !d. 
26 !d. at 2191 n.2, 319 N.E.2d at 425 n.2. 
§13.6. 1 MAss. APP. CT. R. 1:28. Rule 1:28 provides in full: 
At any time following the filing of the appendix (or the filing of the original rec-
ord) and the briefs of the parties on any appeal in accordance with the applicable 
provisions of Rules 14(b), 18 and 19 of the Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure, a panel of the justices of this court, acting on its own motion and without 
entertaining oral argument, may determine that no substantial question of law is 
presented by the appeal and may, by its written order, affirm the action of the 
court below. Any such order shall be subject to the pro"isions of Rules 27 and 27.1 
of the Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure (effective September 8, 1975). 
2 !d. 
3 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 384, 341 N.E.2d 880. 
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appropriate. 4 Therefore, despite the urgings of the Boston and Mas-
sachusetts Bar Associations, the Court declined to direct any change 
in the Rule at this time. 5 
Restrictions on oral argument have been imposed with accelerating 
frequency in recent years, particularly by federal courts of appeals. 6 
The action of the Massachusetts Appeals Court is a limited but sig-
nificant addition to the growing appellate chorus that rejects the right 
to an oral argument in every case. As is characteristic of rules preclud-
ing oral argument, Rule 1:28 raises some difficult policy questions. 7 
However, unlike the typical summary affirmance rule, Rule 1:28 has 
been further tainted in the eyes of practitioners as a result of the pro-
cedure by which the Rule was adopted. 
Rule 1:28 was adopted with the approval of the Supreme Judicial 
Court but without prior notice to the bar and without any prior op-
portunity for comment by interested persons. Consequently, members 
of the bar were not informed of the policy that caused the Appeals 
Court to adopt the Rule nor could they even be certain that the con-
flicting policies involved had been carefully weighed prior to the 
Rule's adoption. 8 Not until further appellate review was granted by 
the Supreme Judicial Court in Sabatinelli were briefs requested from 
the Massachusetts and Boston Bar Associations on the propriety of 
dismissal of an appeal without oral argument. 9 By requesting these 
briefs, the judiciary appeared to have finally recognized, although 
somewhat belatedly, the interest of the bar in evaluating the validity 
and wisdom of such action. 
After considering the views of the bar, the Court did render a deci-
sion in Sabatinelli that is a cogent and thoughtful analysis of the policy 
factors involved. The Court ·sustained application of the Rule to the 
particular appeaP 0 but strongly emphasized the importance of oral 
argument generally11 and questioned whether the use of the Rule will 
actually result in the practical benefits upon which its adoption was 
premised. 12 
Rule 1:28 is in fact not as complete a departure as it might appear 
4 Id. at 388, 395, 341 N.E.2d at 882, 885. 
5 Id. at 391, 341 N.E.2d at 883-84. 
6 See text at notes 26-31 infra and Sabatinelli, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 395 n.9, 341 
N .E.2d at 885 n.9. 
7 For discussion of these policy issues, see text at notes 20-34 infra. 
8 A rule and screening procedure restricting oral argument was adopted in a similar 
method-i.e., without prior notice to and without prior opportunity for comment by in-
terested persons-by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Address 
by Bernard G. Segal, American College of Trial Lawyers 1974 Spring Meeting, Mar. 
17-20, 197 4 [hereinafter cited as Segal]. 
9 Sabatinelli, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 386, 341 N.E.2d at 882. 
10 /d. at 395, 341 N.E.2d at 885. 
11 /d. at 391-93, 341 N.E.2d at 884. 
12 Id. at 395, 341 N.E.2d at 885. 
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to be from the tradition of hearing oral argument. First, the Rule only 
applies to civil cases in the intermediate appellate court. 13 Second, 
Rule 1:28 may only be used if the Appeals Court intends to affirm the 
trial court's decision. 14 Finally, even if oral argument is precluded at 
the Appeals Court level, a losing party may still request further appel-
late review by the Supreme Judicial Court, which request will be 
granted if "specifically authorized by three justices ... for substantial 
reasons affecting the public interest or the interest of justice."15 The 
availability of this latter safeguard, however, seems of little actual util-
ity since three Supreme Judicial Court Justices must believe a sum-
mary affirmance by the Appeals Court to be so plainly wrong as to af-
fect "the public interest or the interests of justice" before further ap-
pellate review can be granted. 16 Since limited court time is the 
rationale for elimination of oral argument at the intermediate appel-
late level, it is unlikely that Justices of the busy highest court will be 
able to find the time to give an independent complete review of the 
merits of a decision summarily affirmed. Furthermore, it is submitted 
that Rule 1:28 should stand or fall on its merits rather than upon the 
fact that there are safeguards to prevent it from being flagrantly 
abused. · 
Although the constitutionality of denying oral argument has been 
questioned in at least one jurisdiction,17 since 1901, the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court has appeared to doubt that elimination of oral argument 
would be unconstitutional. 18 Federal courts have generally refused to 
hold that the opportunity for argument must always be given on ap-
peal on the grounds, as succinctly stated by Judge Aldrich of the First 
Circuit, that "[d]ue process does not require oral argument in every 
case, as is made apparent by the Supreme Court's summary reversal 
procedure on petition for certiorari."19 Therefore, the question 
whether oral argument ought to be barred in certain cases seems not 
to be one of constitutionality but one of wisdom. 
Some United States Supreme Court Justices have emphasized that 
oral argument can be more effective than a brief. In a discussion of 
restrictions on oral argument, Mr. Justice Brennan stated, "I have had 
too many cases when my judgment of a decision has turned on what 
happened in oral argument, not to be terribly concerned for myself 
13 MASS. APP. CT. R. I :28. 
14 /d. 
15 G.L. c. 211A, § II. 
16 Id. 
17 Bullock v. McGerr, 14 Colo. 577, 585-86, 23 P. 980, 983-84 (1890). 
18 Wall v. Old Colony Trust Co., 177 Mass. 275, 277, 58 N.E. 1015, 1016 (1901). 
19 Magnesium Casting Co. v. Hoban, 401 F.2d 516, 518 (1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 
393 U.S. 1065 (1969). In FCC v. WJR, 337 U.S. 265 (1949), the Supreme Court stated in 
dictum that "the right of oral argument as a matter of procedural due process varies 
from case to case in accordance with differing circumstances . . . . Certainly the Con-
stitution does not require oral argument in all cases where only insubstantial or frivol-
ous questions of law, or indeed even substantial ones, are raised." /d. at 276. 
18
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were I to be denied oral argument."20 The late Justice Harlan put it 
even more broadly by describing oral argument as "perhaps the most 
effective weapon" of the advocate. 21 
Despite these voices, however, appellate courts, particularly at the 
intermediate level, continue to restrict oral argument. Their usual 
reason for doing so is "that the only thing that the judiciary can do to 
meet a problem of the ever-increasing case load is to manage its own 
time."22 Some judges have even gone so far as to assert that in certain 
cases oral argument is "a complete waste of time."23 The Supreme 
Judicial Court contented itself in Sabatinelli with noting that oral ar-
gument is not helpful to a court where there is "no conceivable viable 
appellate issue."24 This statement, however, not only seems too true to 
dispute but also seems to somewhat beg the question. It is hard to 
quarrel with the argument that appellate judges are in the best posi-
tion to determine for themselves what helps them to decide a case. 
The que_stion is, though, whether an appellate court can really predict 
prior to hearing oral argument in a particular case that such argument 
will not reveal a viable appellate issue in that case. 25 
Even if appellate courts can predict with some degree of accuracy 
whether oral argument will be of value in deciding a particular case, 
one would hope that judicial self-restraint would make appellate 
courts reluctant to eliminate oral argument. History, however, demon-
strates that placing oral argument on a lower level of judicial priorities 
20 Remarks by Mr. Justice Brennan, Thirty-Fifth Annual Judicial Conference of the 
Third Judicial Circuit of the United States, Sept. 2I, I972 [hereinafter cited as Annual 
Judicial Conference]. 
21 Harlan, What Part Does the Oral Argument Play in the Conduct of an Appeal, 4I 
CORNELL L.Q. 6, II (1955). A forceful statement of the value of oral argument was 
made by Judge Wilkins in Sabatinelli as follows: 
Oral argument is an important part of the litigation of a case. It has been so re-
garded by numerous informed commentators. It permits the appellate advocate to 
present his client's case in a manner which often can be more persuasive, more in-
cisive, and more effective than an appellate brief. Oral argument allows the advo-
cate to deal immediately with questions and problems which are important to one 
or more of the Justices who hear the argument. Oral argument grants an 
opportunity for an attorney to summarize the issues which are before the court 
and why they should be decided in favor of his client. Often in appellate argument 
an opponent is forced to deal with an issue with which he has been unwilling or 
unable to contend in his brief. 
1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 391-92, 341 N.E.2d at 884. 
22 Address by the Honorable John J. Gibbons, Circuit Judge, Annual Judicial Confer-
ence, supra note 20. 
23 /d. 
24 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 393, 341 N.E.2d at 884. 
25 The Court noted in Sabatinelli, however, how the dispute involved in that case-
the meaning of clear language in two insurance policies-dramatized that the uselessness of 
oral argument can be predicted from a reading of briefs and records. /d. at 393 n.7, 341 
N.E.2d at 884 n.7. 
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results in swift and dramatic elimination of oral argument in a vast 
number of cases. The experience in the federal system is instructive. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit established 
a screening procedure by which it classified each case being appealed 
to it in one of four ways: a) frivolous, b) appeals where the case is de-
termined by the judges to be of such a character as not to require oral 
argument, c) limited argument of fifteen minutes, and d) full thirty 
minutes argument. 26 During the first eighty days after this screening 
procedure was established, argument was denied by the Fifth Circuit 
in 30 percent of the appeals classified, only one of which was classed 
as frivolous. 27 Five years later, oral argument was given in only 43 
percent of the appeals decided and, during one period, only 30 per-
cent of the cases were argued orally. 28 This trend was concomitant 
with oral argument lasting thirty minutes a side in only 8 percent of 
all appeals or one out of every twelve cases. 29 
The Third Circuit's experience is even more dramatic. In this cir-
cuit, oral argument could be dispensed with or shortened by unan-
imous order of the panel assigned a case.30 After this rule had been 
in effect for only 22 months, oral argument was denied in 50 percent 
of the appeals decided. 31 
The history of federal screening practices demonstrates how easy it 
is for courts to find ways to dispose of much of an appellate docket 
without oral argument. Yet, the benefits of eliminating oral argument 
appear in fact to be illusory. Commentators have cfiaracterized the 
time saved by eliminating oral argument as insignificant.32 The Su-
preme Judicial Court has even suggested that the operation of Rule 
1 :28 might turn out to be more time consuming than the allowance of 
oral argument in all appeals, including insubstantial ones, would be.33 
This history of the increasing elimination of oral argument in the 
federal court system raises another issue that should be considered in 
deciding whether the benefits of rules restricting oral argument actu-
ally do outweigh their disadvantages. Statements of eminent judges 
that an oral argument can change their minds and affect the outcome 
of a case confirm what it appears clients tend to believe-that some 
judges listen better than they read. 34 Sometimes the appearance to the 
26 Murphy v. Houma Well Serv., 409 F.2d 804, 806 (5th Cir. 1969). 
27 Id. at 807 & n.8. 
28 Segal, supra note 8. 
29 I d. 
3o Id. 
31 I d. For a discussion of federal screening procedures, particularly in the Ninth Cir-
cuit, see In re Amendment of Rule 3, 440 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1970). 
32 Segal, supra note 8. 
aasabatinelli, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 395,341 N.E.2d at 885. 
34 United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, In Re Oral Argument, 
PRACTICAL LAWYER 12 ( 1955 ). 
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public of the litigation process is as important as the way it actually 
works. 
It is always hard for a lawyer to explain to a client why he lost the 
client's case. The burden becomes intolerable if the lawyer is forced to 
tell his client that he never even had an opportunity to argue that 
case. The Appeals Court should view any savings in judicial time in 
light of the public process in which it is engaged. Rule 1:28 must be 
used carefully. 
§13.7. The New District/Municipal Courts Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. Certainly the most profound change in the civil procedure 
of the Commonwealth to occur during the Survey year is the com-
prehensive revision and uniform codification of the rules of civil pro-
cedure governing practice in the Municipal Court of the City of Bos-
ton and the seventy-two district courts within the Commonwealth. 
These new rules, taking effect on July 1, 1975,1 work far-reaching 
changes in the manner of practice of the majority of the lawyers in 
the Commonwealth. Made possible by comprehensive enabling 
legislation,2 the new District/Municipal Courts Rules of Civil Proce-
dure track, in large measure, the successful Massachusetts Rules of 
Civil Procedure in effect in the superior court since July 1, 197 4. In 
so doing, the new Rules have vastly changed traditional district court 
practice. The old, nonentry system, whereby a case in the district 
court was commenced by delivering the writ and summons to the 
sheriff for service to be followed up with a declaration filed in court 
on or before the return day, is no more. Under the new Rules, an ac-
tion is commenced, as in the superior court, by delivering or mailing 
to the clerk of the proper court a complaint and an entry fee. 3 
Moreover, the entire panoply of pretrial discovery tools-depositions, 
production of documents and other things, entry upon land for in-
spection and other purposes, and physical and mental examination of 
persons-has been imported into district court practice. 4 
Yet, while the similarities between procedures in the superior and 
district/municipal courts now far outweigh the differences, some dif-
ferences remain and these may have important consequences for the 
practitioner. This sectiop will examine certain of these differences, 
highlighting those that would appear to have the most impact upon 
§13. 7. 1 Acts of 1975, c. 377, § 164; Order of the Chief Justice of the District Courts 
and the Justices of the Municipal Court of the City of Boston, January 8, 1975. 
2 Acts of 1975, c. 377. This legislation ought to be read in co~unction with Acts of 
1973, c. 1114, in order to trace the evolution of the statutory framework within which 
the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure operate. 
3 DIST}MUN. CTS. R. CIV. P. 3. Accord, MASS. R. CIV. P. 3. 
4 DIST./MUN. CTS. R. CIV. P. 26-37. Cf MASS. R. CIV. P. 26-37. 
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the preparation for and trial of cases. 5 
By design, the District/Municipal Courts Rules apply to a more lim-
ited class of cases than do the parallel Massachusetts Rules of Civil 
Procedure used in the superior court. 6 In the superior court, the Mas-
sachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure apply to all civil proceedings ex-
cept ten enumerated, unique kinds of actions. 7 In the district and 
municipal courts "[n]o attempt is made to list the many ... District 
Court civil proceedings to which [the] rules do not apply,'' 8 and, in-
stead, the District/Municipal Courts Rules apply only to "cases tradi-
tionally considered tort, contract, replevin, or equity actions, except 
small claims actions."9 The result of this difference in approach would 
seem to be that certain causes of action over which both the superior 
and district/municipal courts have concurrent or related jurisdiction 
will be treated differently depending upon the forum involved. 
For example, civil commitments of the mentally ill under section 8 
of chapter 123 of the General Laws fall outside the new 
District/Municipal Courts Rules of Civil Procedures when such com-
mitment is ordered by a district court. 10 Appeals from such orders 
under section 9 of chapter 123 of the General Laws, will be heard in 
the superior court pursuant to the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, however.U In the same fashion, a zoning appeal, if brought in 
the district court, will not be subject to the District/Municipal Courts 
5 The first analytic comparison of the Massachusetts and District/Municipal Courts 
Rules appeared in Perlin & Connors, New District Court Procedural Legislation, 3 Mas-
sachusetts Lawyers Weekly 647 (June 30, 1975). It was revised and republished as Per-
lin & Connors, New District Court Civil Rules and Related Legislation, in RULES OF THE 
CoURTS OF THE COMMONWEALTH§ M at 1-22 (1975) [hereinafter Perlin & Connors]. It 
remains the best quick reference source of comparison of the two rules' systems. 
6 For ease of comparison, district court practice will here be compared only to 
superior court practice even though it is clear that the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure apply not only to civil proceedings in the superior court but also to certain civil 
proceedings before a single justice of the Appeals Court and in the probate and hous-
ing courts, the land court, and the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County (single 
justice session). MASS. R. Civ. P. I. 
7 MASS. R. CIV. P. 81 (a)(l)-(10). 
8 Reporters Notes to Dist./Mun. Cts. R. Civ. P. 81. 
9 DIST./MuN. CTS. R. CIV. P. 8i(a). The Reporters to the District/Municipal Courts 
Rules assert that the reference to "traditional considerations" is necessitated by the abo-
lition of separate causes of action. Reporters' Notes to Dist./Mun. Cts. R. Civ. P. 81. See 
DisTJMuN. CTS. R. CIV. P. 2. The choice of phrase in District/Municipal Courts Rule 81 
may be infelicitous, however, since, should the Legislature subsequently create by stat-
ute a cause of action sounding in tort but not heretofore known to our jurisprudence, 
it may be possible to argue that the District/Municipal Coutts Rules do not apply to its 
adjudication, thus defeating the principle of uniformity. 
10 See generally Gallup v. Alden, 1975 Mass. Dist./Mun. Cts. App. Div. Adv. Sh. 113. 
11 MAss. R. Civ. P. 81. Proceedings in the superior court relative to the adjudication, 
commitment, and release of sexually dangerous persons are not, however, subject to the 
Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure. MAss. R. CIV. P. 8l(a)(8). 
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Rules of Civil Procedure12 but the same proceeding, brought in the 
superior court, most assuredly will be subject to the Massachusetts Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 13 
One change effected by the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure 
that caused some consternation within the bar was the requirement 
that the process server make his return of service to the court. 14 The 
plaintiffs attorney who had requested service thus had no way of as-
certaining whether service had been made without calling the clerk of 
the appropriate superior court. This problem has been ameliorated in 
the new District/Municipal Courts Rules by requiring the process 
server to make his proof of service not only to the court but also "to 
the party or his attorney, as the case may be, who has requested such 
service."15 This addition in reality imposes no substantial burden on 
the process server and makes it easier for the plaintiffs attorney to 
determine that service has been made. Should the procedure prove 
successful in district and municipal court practice, we may yet see a 
revision of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure along the same 
lines. 16 
Subsequent pleadings and papers in a superior court action, if 
served first upon the opposing party or his counsel, must be filed in 
12 Perlin & Connors, supra note 5, § M at 8. 
13 Pierce v. Board of Appeals of Carver, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 572, 574, 582, 343 
N.E.2d 412. In practice, it is as yet unclear how much difference it will make, other 
than in pre-trial discovery, whether a proceeding is governed by the new 
District/Municipal Courts Rules or not since District/Municipal Courts Rule 81(a) itself 
provides that"civil proceedings to which these rules do not apply shall follow the course 
of the common law, as near to these rules as may be, except that depositions shall not 
be taken, nor interrogatories served, save by order of the court on motion, with notice, 
for good cause shown." In the single justice session of the Supreme Judicial Court and 
in the superior court, even exempt proceedings tend to follow the procedures called for 
by the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure. See, for example, the papers filed in 
Cappetta v. Orthodontics Limited, Inc., No. 75-191 (Supreme Judicial Court, Mar. 12, 
1976) (proceeding pertaining to involuntary dissolution of a corporation and distribu-
tion of its assets-exempt under Massachusetts Rule of Civil Procedure 81(a)(6)). 
14 MASS. R. CIV. P. 4(f). 
15 DIST./MuN. CTS. R. C!V. P. 4(f). 
16 In passing, it is worth noting that although both the Massachusetts Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the District/Municipal Courts Rules of Civil Procedure permit service on 
an individual defendant in the Commonwealth by leaving copies of the summons and 
complaint at "his last and usual place of abode," MAss. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1); DIST JMuN. 
CTS. R. Ctv. P. 4(d)(1), G.L. c. 223, § 31, as most recently amended by Acts of 1975, c. 
377, § 27, requires "in an action brought in the district court," the mailing of the sum-
mons and complaint by first class mail addressed to the defendant at his last and usual 
place of abode in addition to leaving it there as required by these two Rules. In addition, 
the Massachusetts Rules of Domestic Relations Procedure, governing proceedings for 
divorce, separate support and custody of minor children, and annulment and affirma-
tion of marriage in the probate courts, see MAss. R. DoM. REL. P. 1, require service in 
hand to the defendant unless the defendant is not amenable to such service, in which 
case substituted service must be made in a manner approved by the court. MASS. R. 
DoM. REL.P. 4(d); PROB. CT. SUPP. R. 407. 
23
Curtin and Young: Chapter 13: Civil Practice and Procedure
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1975
§13.7 CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 355 
the superior court "within a reasonable time" thereafter. 17 In the dis-
trict and municipal courts, a pleading or paper served first upon the 
opposing party or his counsel must be filed in court "within five days 
thereafter."18 One suspects, that although the superior court will en-
force its rules in light of all the circumstances of a particular case, the 
promulgation of the District/Municipal Courts Rules will tend to fix a 
five-day period as the "reasonable time" within which a paper first 
served upon an opposing party or his counsel ought to be filed in the 
superior court. Surely the cautious practitioner will so interpret the 
Rules. 
Although the substantive rules of pleading are now the same in 
both the superior and district courts, the District/Municipal Courts 
Rules require that any pleading that alleges a claim for monetary 
damages set forth "the amount ofthe damages so demanded."19 No such 
requirement is found in the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure and, 
indeed, where the ad damnum is stated, under superior court practice it 
may not be read to the jury.20 In the district court, however, a precise 
statement of the amount of damages claimed is crucial to a determination 
of the rights of the parties to remove the case to the superior court. Since 
April 14, 1975, no case entered in the district courts on or after July 28, 
1974, could be removed to the superior court before trial unless the ad 
damnum exceeded $4,000.21 
The new District/Municipal Courts Rules introduced into district 
court practice, in the place of recoupment and setoff, the concepts of 
cross-claims between plaintiffs or defendants and counterclaims, both 
compulsory and permissive. 22 The advent of these various additional 
claims on the district court scene has necessitated a rethinking of the 
relationship of the superior and district courts and a litigant's right to 
choose his forum. This new relationship has been carefully worked 
out, and the rights of the litigant defined with fair !!recision in sec-
tions 103 and 104 of chapter 377 of the Acts of 1975. 3 
As has long been the law, if a plaintiff "elects to bring in any district 
court any action or other civil proceeding which he might have begun 
in the superior court, he shall be deemed to have waived a trial by 
jury and his right of appeal to the superior court, unless the said ac-
tion or other civil proceeding is removed to the superior court," in 
17 MAss. R. CIV. P. 5(d). 
18 DIST.IMUN. CTS. R. C!V. P. 5(d). 
19 DIST./MuN. CTS. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Cf MAss. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
2o SUPER. CT. R. 7. 
2 1 Acts of 1975, c. 123, amending G.L. c. 231, § 104. Indeed, five and one half months 
earlier, the justices of the superior court had voted to remand to the district courts all 
civil cases where there was no "reasonable likelihood that recovery [would] exceed four 
thousand ($4,000) dollars if the plaintiff prevails." Super. Ct. R. 29. 
22 DIST./MUN. CTS. R. CIV. P. 13. 
23 Acts of 1975, c. 377, §§ 103-04, amending G.L. c. 231, §§ 103-04. 
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which case the plaintiff has the same rights as he would have had had 
he originally commenced the action in the superior court. 24 Thus, if 
the plaintiff commences in a district court an action in which he seeks 
monetary damages in the amount of $10,000, he has waived the right 
to trial by jury and the right to appeal to the superior court from an 
adverse finding. Nevertheless, since the amount of the ad damnum is 
$10,000, the defendant has the right to remove the action to the 
superior court,25 in which case the plaintiff can, at that time, claim a 
trial by jury. Conversely, if the plaintiff brings an action in the district 
court and claims damages in the amount of $2,000 (nonremovable) 
and the defendant asserts a permissive counterclaim seeking damages 
in the amount of $10,000 (removable), then the plaintiff, but not the 
defendant (who chose to bring his permissive counterclaim in the dis-
trict court), can remove the entire action to the superior court.26 In 
order to remove a case to the superior court, the party against whom 
a claim in excess of $4,000 is asserted, must request a trial in the 
superior court within 25 days of the service upon him of the pleading 
setting forth the claim in which recovery in an amount in excess of 
$4,000 is assertedP 
A special case is presented by the nature of the compulsory coun-
terclaim. If a defendant does not plead a compulsory counterclaim, he 
will lose it.28 Consequently, the defendant who must plead a compul-
sory counterclaim to an action brought by the plaintiff in a district 
court is given the right himself to remove the entire action to the 
superior court if the amount of his compulsory counterclaim exceeds 
$4,000.29 Naturally, the general twenty-five-day time period for re-
moval, running from the date of the service of the claim giving rise to 
the right to remove, does not apply to a compulsory counterclaim, 
where removal is sought by the defendant making the claim. Accord-
ingly, a different time period is established by the statute to govern 
the right to remove in such instances. The defendant who makes a 
compulsory counterclaim must file his claim of trial by the superior 
court no later than five days aTter the time his answer is due.30 Unless 
extended by order of the court, the defendant in a district court ac-
tion has twenty days after service to file his answer. 31 Thus, the de-
fendant who is filing a compulsory counterclaim actually has a total of 
twenty-five days-and longer if he gets a court approved extension of 
24 G.L. c. 231, § I 03, as amended by Acts of 197 5, c. 377, § I 03. 
25 Id. § 104, as amended by Acts of 1975, c. 377, § 104. 
28 Id. § 103, as amended by Acts of 1975, c. 377, § 103. 
27 Id. § 104, as amended lr; Acts of 1975, c. 377, § 104. 
28 DIST./MuN. CTs. R. C1v. P. 13(a); Reporters Notes to MAss. R. CIV. P. 13. See 
Buckley v. John, 314 Mass. 719, 721,51 N.E.2d 317,319 (1943). 
29 G.L. c. 231, § 104, as amended by Acts of 1975, c. 377, § 104. 
3o !d. 
31 DIST./MUN. CTS. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(l). 
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time to answer-before he must request removal to the superior 
court. 32 
The amended statutes contain an anomaly, however. Although it is 
made very clear that a plaintiff, who is the victim of a cross-claim in 
excess of $4,000 pleaded by a coplaintiff, has the right to remove the 
entire action to the superior court,33 no such express right of removal 
is given to a defendant who finds himself on the receiving end of a 
cross-claim by a codefendant in excess of $4,000. Naturally, cross-
claims between codefendants are far more common than are cross-
claims between coplaintiffs, who may be expected to have agreed at 
least upon the bringing of the original suit. It would indeed be incon-
gruous if section 104 of chapter 231 of the General Laws were to be 
read as permitting the plaintiff who is the subject of a cross-claim in 
excess of $4,000 to remove, while denying the same right to the de-
fendant in the same position. This result need not follow, however, 
since the statute provides that "[a]ny other party ... may, provided 
that the amount of the claim against such other party . . . exceeds 
four thousand dollars," remove the action to the superior court. 34 
Admittedly, this reading ignores the express grant of such rights to 
both the plaintiff and the defendant in the circumstances discussed 
above. Under the expressio unius exclusio alterius rule of statutory con-
struction, the use of the phrase "any other party" could give rise to an 
argument that the "other party" referred to in section 104 is limited 
to third-party defendants and does not refer to a defendant who is 
the subject of a cross-claim.35 Nonetheless, a more equitable reading 
of the statute would seem to require that this argument be rejected, 
and it is unfortunate that the draftsmanship is so oblique as to lend it-
self to this construction. 
Once it is finally determined· that the action will proceed first to 
trial in the district court, consideration must be given to the unique 
aspects of trial preparation under the District/Municipal Courts Rules. 
For example, although the district courts are open on Saturdays, in-
termediate Saturdays are nevertheless excluded in computing the time 
for taking any action required to be accomplished in less than seven 
days under the Rules. Saturdays are included when the time allowed 
for taking any action is seven days or more and, even though the dis-
trict court may be open on Saturday, if the last day within which ac-
tion must be taken falls on a Saturday, the period of time within 
which action is permitted to be taken runs until "the end of the next 
32 The defendant is, allowed the normal twenty days to answer plus five days before 
he must remove, or a total of twenty-five days. 
33 G.L. c. 231, §§ 103, 104, as amended by Acts of 1975, c. 377, §§ 103, 104. 
34 !d., § 104, as amended by Acts of 1975, c. 377, § 104. 
35 Cf Harborview Residents' Comm. Inc. v. Quincy Housing Authority, 1975 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 2433, 2443, 332 N.E.2d 891, 895. 
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day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday."36 
The careful practitioner will also note the substantive differences 
from superior court practice that are provided in the Dis-
trict/Municipal Courts Rules for pre-trial discovery. One such 
change reflects the fact that the jurisdiction of the superior court is 
state-wide whereas the jurisdiction of a particular district court is lim-
ited to its judicial district. Accordingly, the District/Municipal Courts 
Rules provide that, in the case of depositions taken outside the judi-
cial district in which the action is pending, disputes arising during the 
course of the taking of the deposition-e.g. the refusal of the witness 
to answer a question upon the grounds of an assertion of privilege, 
the need for an immediate protective order to prevent har-
assment-may be brought before the district court judge in the 
judicial district in which the deposition is being taken or before the 
district court in which the action is pending.37 This mechanism not 
only provides an expedient for quick resolution of disputes during the 
course of the deposition, but also provides the party seeking court ac-
tion with the choice of a forum. Naturally, the party seeking to com-
pel an answer refused during the course of a deposition may wish to 
review the entire transcript and then make his motion before the 
judge who may ultimately be expected to hear the case, on the theory 
that the familiarity of that judge with the case will aid the party seek-
ing the order. 38 
Further, it ought to be noted that, unlike superior court practice, 
which requires seven days notice to the defendant upon an applica-
tion for judgment by default for failure to answer interrogatories,39 
district court practice now permits the clerk to enter a final judgment 
against the defendant, upon the request of the plaintiff, immediately 
after the thirty-day conditional default period provided for by Dis-
36 DIST./MUN. CTS. R. CIV. P. 6(a). 
37 DIST./MUN. CTS. R. CJV. P. 37(a)(l). 
38 This procedure serves well when a party refuses to answer a question put to him in 
a deposition. What of a nonparty witness, however, whose only connection with the law-
suit is the information he is called upon to give in his deposition? Suppose such a non-
party witness lives in Williamstown and his deposition is taken there in a case pending 
in the District Court of Nantucket. If he should refuse to answer a question on the 
ground that it invades his own relationship with his attorney, it seems onerous to re-
quire him to defend such a refusal out on Nantucket when without prior approval of 
the court, he could not have been subpoenaed to give his testimony at a deposition on 
Nantucket. DIST./MUN. CTS. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(2). Perhaps an adequate answer is found 
in District/Municipal Courts Rule 26(c) 'which permits the Williamstown witness, at the 
time he receives the subpoena notifying him of his deposition, to move for a protective 
order in the District Court of Williamstown to the effect that, notwithstanding 
District/Municipal Courts Rule 37(a)(l), in view of the distance from Williamstown to 
Nantucket, disputes arising in the course of his deposition shall be resolved in his local 
court. 
39 MASS. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2). 
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trict/Municipal Courts Rule 33(b) has expired, "when the plaintiffs 
claim against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum which can 
by computation be made certain."40 
Finally, although the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure have 
made it unnecessary to take formal exception to rulings or orders of 
the court during the course of trial,41 it is still necessary in district 
court practice to make a request for a report to the appellate division 
of the district courts at the time a district court judge rules upon the 
admission or exclusion of evidence in a manner contrary to that 
sought by the party seeking a report. It is also necessary for the party 
seeking a report to reduce his request to writing and file it with the 
clerk of the appropriate district court "within 5 days after the hearing 
of all the evidence."42 The continuation of this cumbersome proce-
dure is necessitated by the absence of any reliable system of transcrib-
ing the evidence in most of our district court hearings. It is therefore 
necessary that the court's attention be specifically focused upon those 
matters that a litigant wishes to make the subject of an appeal and 
that there be some written evidence of contested rulings upon which 
an appeal can be based. It is virtually impossible to overstate the im-
portance of this requirement in district court practice. It is not 
enough to merely object to the admission of evidence. If the court 
rules, after counsel's objection, that the evidence is to be admitted 
nevertheless, it is absolutely necessary for counsel to make the further 
statement, "Your Honor, I respectfully request a report of that rul-
ing." Failure to present such a request for a report to the trial judge is 
fatal to the right to prosecute an appeal asserting error in that 
ruling.43 Until a more comprehensive and accurate system is devised 
for preparing a transcript of district court proceedings, therefore, the 
"request for a report" made orally immediately following a judge's 
ruling upon the admission or exclusion of evidence will be a feature 
of our district court practice. 
40 DIST./MUN. CTS. R. C1v. P. 55(b)(l). 
41 MASS. R. C!V. P. 46. 
42 DIST./MUN. CTS. R. CIV. P. 64(a). 
43 Murphy v. William C. Barry, Inc., 295 Mass. 94, 97, 3 N.E.2d 214, 215 (1936). 
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